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I.

INTRODUCTION

“In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is
no other way. And in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat
them differently. . . .” —
Harry A. Blackmun, former U.S. Supreme Court Justice.1
Employment discrimination is more prevalent today than ever. During a time when
America has elected its first black President, one would at least think that black job applicants
would have employment opportunities equal to those of their white counterparts. Unfortunately,
the notion of employment equality has consistently been proven to be unfounded in today‟s
society. The blatant acts of discrimination that black citizens became so accustomed to hundreds
of years ago have taken on a more facially neutral form. There are no longer signs hanging
outside of businesses stating, “We Don‟t Hire Blacks” or “White Applicants Only.” Since the
passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642, employers now know that such manifest
acts of discrimination would no longer be tolerated under the law.
In today‟s society, employers are increasingly using discriminatory practices such as
stereotypes and grooming policies to deny black applicants employment and advancement
opportunities equivalent to those of white applicants. Many employers frequently associate
being black with words such as “incompetent” and “unworthy.”3 Consequently, even though the

1

Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2008).
3
D. Aaron Lacy, The Most Endangered Title VII Plaintiff?: Exponential Discrimination Against Black Males, 86
NEB. L. REV. 552, 564 (2008).
2

2

number of college educated black candidates has continually increased since 1985,4 they do not
tend to fare as well in job placement when compared to white candidates. This phenomenon can
be attributed to the discriminatory tactics used by many employers in today‟s labor market.
Despite years of efforts by the government to address discrimination in employment, this
problem remains pervasive.5
Discriminatory employment practices utilized by many employers will likely not cease
until the legal system realizes that its approach to combating these practices is out of touch with
the facial neutrality of these employed methods. Title VII has failed to safeguard African
Americans from the sword of racial employment practices mainly because the Act has primarily
been applied by federal courts in a manner that does not comport with the realities of modern
racism.6 Although, various federal courts once acknowledged that race was a fluid and socially
constructed concept, many currently view race as totally a physical concept.7 This view leaves
the door wide open for employers to discriminate through usage of stereotyping and grooming
policies.8
Part II of this article begins with a hypothetical involving a black male by the name of
Treyvon Smith who is about to graduate from business school. The article follows his plight as
Treyvon struggles with the reality that his race may be the single factor that is hindering his job
search, even though he has sent numerous resumes to employers exhibiting qualifications
superior to many of his peers who have advanced in their employment searches.

4

African Americans Continue to Make Solid Gains in Bachelor and Master Degree Awards: But Professional and
Doctoral Degrees Show Declines, The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, July 1, 2008 (Anonymous) (since
1985 the number of blacks earning bachelor‟s degrees have increased by 148 percent).
5
See infra Part V.
6
Angela Onwuachi-Willig, By Any Other Name?: On Being “Regarded As” Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply
Even if Lakisha and Jamal are White, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1283, 1284 (2005).
7
Id. at 1313.
8
Id.
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Part III of the article introduces Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and thoroughly
examines the two frameworks which are recognized by most courts in the United States. Case
law demonstrates the manner in which the Supreme Court uses Title VII frameworks to render
judicial opinions.
Part IV leads into a discussion about the term “race,” and further explores how it has
been defined and applied historically. It examines various studies and opinions of scholars who
have sought to determine whether race is primarily a biological concept or a product of society.
Additionally, this section reveals that the inability of society and the judiciary to decide on a
concrete definition of the term “race” has led to a lack of protection being afforded to black
citizens who have filed discrimination claims.
Part V takes an in-depth look into discriminatory employment practices used in today‟s
labor market once resumes have been submitted for advertised positions, and also once
applicants have been successful in obtaining an offer of employment. Studies by Marianne
Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan,9 and Margery Austin Turner, Michael Fox and Raymond J.
Struyk,10 are analyzed to demonstrate that simply being “black” can decrease one‟s employment
opportunities. Further, these studies reveal that black applicants who have excellent
qualifications still do not fare as well as their white counterparts. Most importantly, the studies
seriously raise inquiries regarding the effectiveness of Title VII as a cure for racially
discriminatory employment practices.

9

Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A
Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination (Nat‟l Bureau of Econ. Research, Paper No. 9873, 2002),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9873.
10
MARGERY A. TURNER et al., OPPORTUNITIES DENIED, OPPORTUNITIES DIMINISHED; RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN
HIRING, 2 (Urban Institute Report, 91-9) (1991).
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Part VI argues that current case law fails to acknowledge that employer decision-making
based upon stereotypes is a form of disparate treatment based on race. A review of case law will
demonstrate that requirements such as grooming policies are regularly used by employers to
discriminate against black employees. Further, additional case law will reveal the unwillingness
of courts to acknowledge these types of policies as proxies for race discrimination.
Part VII charts a course for reform of current anti-discrimination approaches. It examines
various suggested changes to current anti-discrimination law and advocates an approach that will
make the EEO process more efficient and effective. It argues that the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) should refocus its efforts away from individual complaints
of discrimination so that it may aggressively target the employment practices of employers in
today‟s labor market.

II.

HYPOTHETICAL

Treyvon Smith is a young black man who is completing his final semester of business
school at Midlands University. The university is situated in an affluent suburb of the city of
Midlands. Treyvon is one of only a few black students who were fortunate to gain admissions to
Midlands University through a minority grant program. Midlands University is predominately
traditional in its racial composition. Treyvon looks and acts quite differently than his black
counterparts at Midlands University. He wears his hair in nicely groomed dreadlocks. Also,
Treyvon is very proud of his black heritage and frequently speaks to his classmates regarding his
cultural background.

Treyvon lives in an area south of downtown Midlands which is

predominately populated by low-income black families.

5

Although, Treyvon is quite distinguishable from most students at Midland University, he
has generally been accepted by a vast number of his peers. Until recently, Treyvon has never
had a reason to question his pride and status as a black man. The time of year has approached
when students who will graduate are to begin submitting their resumes to various employers
throughout the city of Midlands. Treyvon is thankful that he had an opportunity to complete two
internships during his time at Midlands University. He is confident that these experiences will
place him ahead of many students who have not had an opportunity to take advantage of such
experiences.
Currently, more than five weeks have passed since Treyvon has sent numerous resumes
to prospective employers. Since that time, he has only completed a phone screening with a
single employer. Many of the students at Midlands University have received call-backs and
others have gone on their first and second interviews with prospective employers.

After

investigation, Treyvon discovers that many of the employers that have responded to several of
his peers‟ employment inquires are the same employers to whom he also sent resumes. He is
perplexed by the lack of interest that employers are showing his resume, which implicitly
showcases the practical experiences that he has acquired. Since Treyvon regularly converses
with many of his peers who have received call-backs, he personally knows that they do not have
qualifications that are superior to his. These turn of events has Treyvon wondering, “Is there
something about me that is impeding my employment prospects? Could it be because I am a
product of the „ghetto?‟ Or is it simply because I am black?” Unfortunately, for Treyvon, Title
VII statutory framework currently used in determining whether discriminatory tactics are at use
by employers will likely not provide any clarity as it pertains to his dilemma.

6

III.

TITLE VII STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from: (1) not hiring or
discharging individuals, or otherwise differentiating among individuals with respect to
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or (2) to categorize employees or applicants for employment in a manner
which would hinder or tend to hinder them from job opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
their status as employees, because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.11
During the time that Title VII was originally enacted, racial discrimination was open and
categorical.12 Black people were frequently excluded from jobs or situated into positions with
low pay and little prestige simply because of their race.13

This article reveals that race

discrimination in employment is as vibrant today as it was in the mid 1900s. Although, the
Supreme Court has had several opportunities to address modern practices of discrimination in
employment, it has repeatedly failed to do so.
The EEOC is the government organization that has been charged with regulating charges
of discrimination arising under Title VII.14 “Race remains the most frequently cited basis in
discrimination charges, as it has since the Commission‟s inception.”15 The EEOC states that
“[r]ace discrimination involves treating someone (an applicant or employee) unfavorably
because he/she is of a certain race or because of personal characteristics associated with race

11

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2008).
Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Race Discrimination: An Argument About Assimilation, 74 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 365 (2006).
13
Id.
14
Occidental Life Ins. Co. of California v. E.E.O.C., 432 U.S. 355, 355 (1977) (the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972 gives the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission authority to sue in federal courts when it finds
reasonable cause to believe that there has been employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin).
15
Naomi C. Earp, Forty-Three and Counting: EEOC‟s Challenges and Successes and Emerging Trends in the
Employment Arena, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 133, 141 (2007).
12
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(such as hair texture, skin color, or certain facial features).”16 This definition is defined quite
loosely covering a broad range of attributes that are frequently associated with a person‟s race. 17
Conversely, Title VII fails to explicitly define race in terms that can guide the Supreme Court in
ruling on cases involving race discrimination.18 Courts have tended to use judicial definitions
from Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection jurisprudence to supplement this void. 19 Take for
instance, “the Supreme Court's suggest[ion] [in Fourteenth Amendment analysis] that one of the
reasons that races and ethnic groups are offered antidiscrimination protection is because they
possess visible, identifiable characteristics that function as irrational bases for stigma;” as a
result, many courts that interpret Title VII have viewed it as intending to primarily address
employment discrimination that is prompted by race/ethnicity-associated morphology.20 This
results in a lack of precedent favorable for plaintiffs to use in establishing a prima facie claim of
race discrimination under Title VII.
Unfortunately, Title VII‟s disparate treatment and impact frameworks tend to support a
claim that is more closely aligned with the Supreme Court‟s suggestion in Fourteenth
Amendment analysis. A close examination of the burdens which must be met within each
framework demonstrates the barriers preventing recognition of discrimination which may be
prompted by aspects that are not race/ethnicity-associated morphology.

16

Angela P. Harris, From Color Line to Color Chart?: Racism and Colorism in the New Century, 10 BERKELEY J.
AFR.-AM. L. & POL‟Y 52, 68 (2008).
17
See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 6, at 1313.
18
Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of Title VII,
79 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1134, 1200.
19
Id.
20
Id.
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a) Disparate Treatment
In order for a plaintiff to prevail in a race discrimination in hiring case, he or she may use
direct evidence tending to show discriminatory intent or apply the McDonnell-Douglas burden
shifting standard to prove discrimination with indirect evidence.21 A plaintiff can establish this
initial burden by showing (1) he or she is a part of a racial minority/protected class; (2) he or she
submitted an application as a qualified candidate for the position at issue; (3) regardless of his or
her qualifications, he or she was rejected; and (4) after his or her rejection, the position stayed
open and applications were still sought from other individuals.22
If a plaintiff can meet all three prongs, courts typically draw an inference of
discrimination.23

The employer then has the burden of producing a legitimate non-

discriminatory reason for rejecting the applicant.24 A plaintiff then has the opportunity to prove
that the reason given by the employer is not worthy of credence because the employer‟s decision
was based on racial discrimination.25

Additionally, employers can employ a bona fide

occupational defense (“BFOQ”) to substantiate its discriminatory actions towards applicants on
the basis of religion, sex, or national origin.26 It has been argued that the BFOQ defense allows
employers to justify discrimination against applicants or employees based on sex, religion, or
national origin.27 To establish this defense an employer simply has to demonstrate that an
applicant‟s religion, sex or national origin would significantly impede his/her performance of a

21

Id. at 1290-91.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
23
Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 6, at 1291.
24
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
25
Lacy, supra note 3, at 583.
26
Ritu Mahajan, The Naked Truth: Appearance Discrimination, Employment, And The Law, 14 ASIAN AM. L. J.
165, 179 (2007).
27
Jordan D. Bello, Attractiveness as Hiring Criteria: Savvy Business Practice of Racial Discrimination?, 8 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 483, 498 (2004).
22
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specific position.28 The employer must prove that an applicant has to possess a protected
characteristic needed to adequately perform the functions of the position, and hiring someone to
the contrary would alter the nature of the business.29 Therefore, a plaintiff who cannot establish
an employer‟s intentional discrimination may be more resourceful in determining whether he
may prove a prima facie case under disparate impact analysis.
b) Disparate Impact
Courts use disparate impact analysis to examine employment practices that have an
adverse impact on members of a protected group, although intent is not required.30 Disparate
impact analysis requires a plaintiff to prove that an employer utilizes a specific employment
practice that results in a disparate impact on a protected group.31
Plaintiffs have encountered difficulty in establishing that a specific employment practice
has a disparate impact on a certain group, because there are times when there are not many
employees that are members of the relevant group, or those who do qualify choose to conform to
a particular employment practice.32 Because of the subjective nature of many employment
decisions, employees typically have a difficult time demonstrating that a particular employment
practice actually caused the disparate effect.33 In the seminal case that established disparate
impact analysis, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,34 the Supreme Court held that if a plaintiff is able to

28

Mahajan, supra note 26, at 179.
Id. at 179-80.
30
Id. at 178.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE
L. J. 2009, 2027 (1995).
34
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
29
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prove a prima facie case, the employer then must demonstrate that the particular employment
practice is justifiable because it serves a business necessity and relates to job performance.35
Disparate impact theory is not an adequate standard for claims based on discriminatory
proxies because discrimination is usually not premised on an employer‟s subjective mandates,
which could be job relatedness and/or business necessity. Rather, discrimination results from the
application of particular standards by employers.36 Historically, courts have been given wide
discretion in evaluating whether a proffered business concern overshadows the adverse effects of
policies based on discriminatory proxies.37 This prompts the question of whether race even
matters when courts have the discretion to disregard the adverse effects of policies on racial
groups that have been “pre-designated” protected status?

IV.

WHAT IS RACE? DOES RACE MATTER?

“Race may be America’s single most confounding problem, but the confounding
problem of race is that few people seem to know what race is.”38
a) Origins of Race
Professor Cornel West once said, “[t]o engage in a serious discussion of race in America,
we must begin not with the problems of black people but with the flaws of American society –

35

Id. at 431.
Mahajan, supra note 26, at 180.
37
Flagg, supra note 33, at 2021-22 (The nature of the proffered business concern burden is ambiguous. In Griggs,
the Court stated that an employer simply needs to demonstrate that an employment practice has “a demonstrable
relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which it is used.” Such an unclear formulation does not firmly
establish the kinds of purposes that suffice as a business necessity justification, the form of evidence needed to show
a relationship between the purpose and the employment practice, the necessary force of that connection, along with
the significance of the employer‟s stated purpose, and relationship between business necessity and job relatedness.
These issues have not been clarified by the Supreme Court. Unfortunately, “[i]n the 1991 Civil Rights Act,
Congress relied on [Supreme Court decisions that were rendered prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490
U.S. 642 (1989)] to define the concepts of „consistent with business necessity‟ and „job-related‟ and thus preserved
the ambiguity inherent in those opinions”).
38
Ian. F. Lopez, The Societal Construction of Race: Some observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29
HARV. C.R.-CL. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1994).
36
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flaws rooted in historic inequalities and longstanding cultural stereotypes.”39 America has an
extensive history of distinguishing among persons based on race.40

An individual‟s racial

identity has long been important in determining personal status and legal rights.41 Professor Paul
Finkelman recently stated that, “[t]he word „race‟ defies precise definition in American Law. No
physical attribute or collection of physical attributes adequately defines „race.‟” 42 However, the
concept of race is at the pinnacle of contemporary discussions involving employment, healthcare,
politics, and practically every aspect of what shapes our society today. Courts and legislatures
have long struggled to define the line between “black” and “white” primarily to “separate the
privileged from those with limited or no privileges.”43
Virginia was the first state in the union to attempt to provide a statutory definition of
race.44 However, the 1662 statute was only designed to determine the legal position of children
that belonged to Negro women but were fathered by Englishmen.45 The language of the 1662
statute declared that the status of a child would be determined by the status of the mother.46
Subsequently, Virginia and Arkansas created statutes that looked to physical appearance in
defining Negros as possessing “a visible and distinct admixture of African blood.”47

39

CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS 3 (Beacons Press 2001) (1993).
Luther Wright, Jr., Who‟s Black, Who‟s White, and Who Cares: Reconceptualizing the United States Definition of
Race and Racial Classifications, 48 VAND. L. REV. 513, 517 (1995).
41
Sharon Hoffman, Is There a Place for “Race” as a Legal Concept?, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1093, 1101(2004).
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Wright, Jr., supra note 40, at 522.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 523 (this was a departure from the English rule that determined a child‟s status from the paternal line).
47
Id. at 523-24 (other states that decided to define race adopted one-fourth, one-sixteenth, and one-thirty-second
rules which determined that individuals who possessed these fractional quantities of black ancestry were legally
black. By 1910, the majority of states applied the “one-drop rule”, which determined that anyone with a drop of
African or black blood was legally black).
40
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Consequently, these laws spurred litigation in which courts had to begin dealing with
questions of racial definition.48 An example of the inability of the courts to precisely define race
is evident in Hudgins v. Wright,49 wherein two judges disagreed as to the evidentiary importance
of physical appearance in determining whether the plaintiff was Black or Native American.50 It
was stated by Judge Tucker that “even if one‟s color is in doubt because of „racial‟ mingling, „a
flat nose and wooly [sic] hair,‟ which disappear „the last of all,‟ can serve as reliable indicators
of an individual‟s status as „African.‟”51 Judge Roane disagreed that such a determination could
always be made from only inspection of certain characteristics.52
Even in today‟s society, race has not yet been defined substantively. 53 Society‟s inability
to define race is one of the most compelling issues in this nation.54 There are currently federal
statutes created to combat racial discrimination in areas of employment, voting, housing,
enforcement of contracts, and education.55 Numerous other policies and vital activities in the
United States are attached to race.56 “Yet amid all of the evidence that racial classification is of
great significance in American Society, the law has provided no consistent definition of race and
no logical way to distinguish members of different races from one another.”57 Therefore, race
matters conceivably now more than ever.

48

Hoffman, supra note 41, at 1130.
11 Va. (1 Hen.) 134, 143 (1806) (the plaintiff was granted freedom by persuading the court that she was Indian
and not black. She asserted that her mother, a slave, was Indian. Her “red complexion” and “straight hair,” were
evidence that she could not possibly be black).
50
Hoffman, supra note 41, at 1130.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Wright, Jr., supra note 40, at 518.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 519.
49
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b) Is Race Biological? OR Is Race a Societal Creature?
Courts confronted with Title VII issues have historically defined race as a biological
concept, and discrimination as a response to certain biologically predetermined traits.58 Federal
courts‟ understanding of the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework and laws designed
to address discrimination in the workplace have repeatedly been criticized by various scholars.59
“Scholars have generally analyzed antidiscrimination law in employment as disregarding and
failing to account for the social realities of racism.”60 For example, Romona L. Paetzold and
Rafael Gely have argued that Title VII, as interpreted, does not offer a framework capable of
dealing with the issues that nontraditional employees face within the internal labor market.61
Professors Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati have studied the ways in which
antidiscrimination law does not account for the way in which racial and gender stereotyping
disadvantage racial minorities.62

Their research has discovered that this failure of

antidiscrimination does not recognize “that race is not purely a physical concept,63 but also a
societal construct.”64

Consequently, employees who file race discrimination claims are

adversely affected.65

58

Rich, supra note 18, at 1134.
Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 6, at 1292.
60
Id. at 1293.
61
Romona L. Paetzold, Through The Looking Glass: Can Title VII Help Women and Minorities Shatter The Glass
Ceiling?, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 1517, 1520 (1995).
62
Devon W. Carbado, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1279-1308 (2000) (providing details of how
women and people of color tend to change their identities to combat discrimination and use of stereotypes within the
work environment).
63
Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 6, at 1292 (classification based on persons with certain skin color or other physical
features that symbolizes membership in a particular racial group).
64
Id.at 1293.
65
Id.
59
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In Perkins v. Lake County Dept. of Utilities,66 an employer who was accused of racial
discrimination under Title VII, challenged whether the plaintiff was Native American.67

The

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio was confronted with the issue of the extent
to which provable genetic/hereditary classification controls on the proposition of membership in
a protected class within the meaning of Title VII.68 Once the Court analyzed the historical
problem associated with defining race, it determined that an employer‟s “reasonable belief” that
a person is a member of a particular protected class governed the issue in the case.69 Lake
County Dept. of Utilities hired an expert to trace the plaintiff‟s ancestry, which led to the
conclusion that the plaintiff was less than one-sixteenth Native American.70 In spite of this
evidence, “the [C]ourt held that the plaintiff‟s appearance, self-identification, and the employer‟s
initial belief and concession that the plaintiff had some Native American ancestry was enough to
prove membership within a protected class under Title VII.”71
The Court believed that it was consistent with the intent of Title VII to hold that
appearance and perception are paramount when racial discrimination is involved.72

It was

determined by the court that although the biological question of race is relevant, it is not
conclusive, and therefore it would consider both biological and societal factors in determining
racial classifications.73 The court‟s rationale underlying its decision is mostly inconsistent with
the holdings of many courts, which state that an employer will only be liable under Title VII if
an employee is sanctioned for displaying involuntary biological, visible, or blatant

66

Perkins v. Lake County Dept. of Utilities, 860 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
Id. at 1263.
68
Id.
69
Wright, Jr., supra note 40, at 553-54.
70
Perkins, 860 F. Supp. at 1266-70.
71
Wright, Jr., supra note 40, at 554.
72
Perkins, 860 F. Supp. at 1277.
73
Wright, Jr., supra note 40, at 554.
67
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distinctiveness associated with a disfavored racial group.74 Therefore, the question of whether
race should be regarded as biological or socially constructed is likely to remain an issue for
courts analyzing future racial discrimination claims brought under Title VII. More importantly,
this issue is likely to allow discrimination in the workplace to evolve and transform into
stereotypical practices in which Title VII will not provide a remedy.

V.

NOW THAT TREYVON HAS SUBMITTED HIS RESUME

a) There is More to Treyvon Than Just His Name
Several years after the Civil Rights Era, although employers are conscious that outward
racial prejudices are not a legally adequate basis for rendering employment decisions, employers
can and do use proxies75 for race, both consciously and unconsciously, in excluding certain
people from employment.76 This form of trait discrimination has increasingly become the focus
of Title VII litigation today.77
Three months have now passed and Treyvon is still awaiting responses from employers.
Although he has not yet received any in-person interviews, he has completed four phoneinterviews. He believes that the phone-interviews went extremely well; nevertheless none have
resulted in an in-person interview. As Treyvon ponders on possible factors that could be
adversely affecting his employment search, he hesitantly dismisses the idea that his race could be
an issue since he did not indicate it on his applications. However, how correct is Treyvon in
making this assumption?

74

See Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc. 527 F. Supp. 299, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
Discrimination based on traits associated with a particular group.
76
Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 6, at 1297-98.
77
Yuracko, supra note 12, at 366.
75

16

Studies have increasingly demonstrated that characteristics associated with race have
“gain[ed] meaning as a defining feature of a racial group and, as a result, have created a basis on
which employers and others may discriminate against an individual due to race-based
[stereotypes] or prejudices toward such characteristics.”78 Historically there have been several
stereotypes associated with “whiteness” and “blackness.”79

Adjectives such as “innocence,

worthiness, competence, collegial, articulate, intelligent, and non-threatening have all been
associated with „whiteness.‟”80 Alternatively, stereotypes such as “athletic, incompetent, guilty,
unworthy, occupational instability, primitive morality, threatening, and dangerous,” have
traditionally been associated with “blackness.”81

Just as society “often link[s] color with

undesirable personal qualities . . .,” it frequently also links a person‟s voice or name with color
and race, and various other negative stereotypes.82 These characteristics at many times “carry
enough ethnic meaning to . . . burden [a person‟s] daily existence with stereotypes imposed by
others.”83
Scholars Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan conducted a study entitled, Are
Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor
Market Discrimination.84 This study exposed employment practices used by various employers
that significantly limited one‟s ability to receive an interview for simply having an African
American85 sounding name.86

78

Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 6, at 1296.
Lacy, supra note 3, at 564.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 6, at 1296-97.
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Bertrand and Mullainathan‟s field experiment consisted of answering help-wanted
advertisements in The Boston Globe and The Chicago Tribune by sending resumes.87 Since
resumes rarely state race, they randomly assigned African American sounding names to some
resumes and white sounding names to others.88 The employers were left with no other means to
determine the race of a particular applicant but by name. 89 The results of the experiment
demonstrated that white sounding names received fifty percent (50%) more callbacks for
interviews than African American sounding names.90

Further, the study demonstrated that

federal contractors and employers who assert “Equal Opportunity Employer” status in their
advertisements also discriminate to the degree that other employers do.91
The results of Bertrand and Mullainathan‟s study reveals that Title VII has not been
successful in combating current practices of discrimination. This is mostly contributed to the
failure of the judiciary to acknowledge the shift away from facial acts of discrimination to acts
that are generally more subtle.92 Treyvon is a primary example of someone who could probably
benefit from a change of perspective by the judiciary in regards to discriminatory stereotypes and
proxies for race. It is likely that Treyvon may be victim of racial discriminatory employment
tactics similar to those used by employers in Bertrand and Mullainathan‟s study. Many would
agree that the name “Treyvon” is prone to be viewed as a “black name” within today‟s society,
and absent any other disqualifying factors, may just what is hindering Treyvon‟s job search.
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b) Treyvon‟s Qualifications or The Perceived Meaning of His Appearance?
“Even if one does not accept today that a black candidate with the same credentials
as a white candidate should be given a preference because of race, fair minds must
agree that race should not be allowed to remain a perennial hurdle either.”93
Does improving credentials of black applicants positively affect discrimination in
employment? Although it would appear that improved credentials would make black applicants
more marketable within the labor market, several studies have demonstrated otherwise.
Particularly, Urban Institute‟s 1990 employment discrimination study, Opportunities Denied,
Opportunities Diminished; Racial Discrimination in Hiring,94 and Jomills H. Braddock II and
James M. McPartland‟s, How Minorities Continue to be Excluded from Equal Employment
Opportunities: Research on Labor Market and Institutional Barriers,95 both reveal that race in
many instances outweighs credentials that are held by black applicants.

Additionally, this

phenomenon is evident from Treyvon‟s plight as a well-qualified black man seemingly unable to
compete in the labor market among similarly qualified non-black job seekers.
Turner‟s study assembled 10 pairs of young black and white men in the Washington D.C.
and Chicago metropolitan areas, and matched them on all aspects that could impact hiring
decisions.96 The hiring audit demonstrated that black job seekers were met with widespread acts
of discrimination throughout the hiring process.97 In fifteen percent (15%) of the audits, the
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white young men received employment offers whereas their “equally qualified” black
counterparts did not.98
Braddock‟s study found that,
for lower-level jobs, white workers were disproportionately represented in
jobs stressing the following characteristics: (1) skills: advanced reading,
basic or advanced arithmetic; (2) intellectual traits: quick learner, good
judgment; and (3) attitudinal traits: being a good team member, and fostering
good client relations. With respect to these skills and intellectual traits, the
authors determined that individual differences in educational attainment and
academic test score performance could not account for overrepresentation of
white applicants.99
This trend can be directly attributed to employer preference for white candidates rather than
“equally qualified” black candidates.100
It has also been suggested “that some white interviewers are predisposed to believing that
[black applicants], no matter what their qualifications, [cannot] be as qualified as white
candidates.”101 Similarly, Bertrand and Mullainathan found in their study that there was a small
and statistically insignificant impact for black applicants to have higher quality resumes. 102 “This
lower reward for [black applicants] suggests that, [in the current state of the labor market],
[black applicants] do not have strong individual incentives to build a stronger resume.”103
This phenomenon unfortunately will impact Treyvon‟s search for employment. Although
he has worked extremely hard to ensure that he is as qualified as his peers, employers in today‟s
market would likely give more consideration to Treyvon‟s appearance as a black person rather
than his superior credentials. So what must Treyvon do to convince employers that he is as
qualified as white applicants vying for similar positions? Regrettably, there is probably nothing
98
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that he can do since skin color seems to be the most valued credential in today‟s labor market.
Perhaps, yet more alarming, is the fact that even once Treyvon manages to land a job, he is likely
to be confronted with discriminatory policies which will seek to compel him to conceal his
identity as a black man.

VI. WHEW! NOW THAT TREYVON HAS THE JOB: TITLE VII CASES
a) “Facially Neutral” Grooming Policies and Trait/Proxy Discrimination
Individuals convey their identities through social practices, including the decisions they
make about dress and appearance practices.104 Treyvon has always expressed his pride for his
identity through the wearing of his nicely-kept dreadlocks, and plans to continue this practice as
he began working at the large accounting firm that recently extended to him an offer of
employment.

It

has

widely

been

recognized

that

Title

VII

does

not

protect

individuals/employees who have been discriminated against based on “voluntary” or
“performed” features of racial or ethnic identity.105 This form of discrimination is frequently
referred to as “discrimination by proxy.”106 Title VII‟s legislative history demonstrates that
Congress “has never indicated that race or national origin should be defined under the statute in a
manner that categorically bars all claims concerning voluntary aspects of racial or ethnic
identity.”107 These voluntary or performed features include “any behavior or voluntary displayed
attribute which, by accident or design, communicates racial or ethnic identity or status.”108
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Employers today often control the appearance of their employees by implementing
grooming and dressing policies.109 Some suggest that employers use these policies as tools to
appeal to customers, and to maintain societal norms and cultural conformity of the company.110
Employers also frequently use grooming and dressing policies “to build on commonly learned
associations” that signify certain characteristics that a company may seek to use in order to align
itself with specific values.111 It is further suggested that dressing and grooming policies facilitate
essential business related functions such as public image of the company, safety, increased
productivity, and increased employee morale.112
While employing dressing and grooming policies to ensure certain essential business
related functions may sometimes be necessary, there are many problems associated with these
policies. Grooming and dressing policies are important since they encompass an employer‟s
intentional or unintentional discrimination.113

These policies are problematic because they

require “the judging of employees based on qualities unrelated to job performance” and further
“reflect[s] certain prejudices [by] adversely affect[ing] the individuals against whom they are
enforced.”114 “Such policies are „arbitrary, irrational, and unfair,‟ as they harm society by
affirming certain appearance-related stereotypes and biases.”115 Even more troubling is the fact
that it is not illegal for employers to use this type of criteria.116
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In her article, Work Culture and Discrimination, Professor Tristin Green, discusses the
tendency for grooming and dressing policies to favor dominant group standards.117 As white
males are prone to be the dominant group to be in charge of implementing and enforcing these
policies, it is likely that the work culture created will disadvantage people of color. 118 “Nor
would it be surprising that employer appearance standards generally devalue racial, cultural, and
religious diversity, often requiring conformity to white, heterosexual notions of beauty and
appearance.”119 Examples of the effects that these policies have on individuals are evident in
cases such as Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc.,120 Carswell v. Peachford Hospital,121 and Smith
v. Delta Airlines, Inc.122
Renee Rogers, a black female employed by American Airlines, sued the airline for
unlawful discrimination under Title VII based on the company‟s grooming policy. 123 She sought
$10,000.00 in damages, as well as injunctive and declaratory relief against enforcement of the
grooming policy.124

The policy prohibited women from wearing all-braided hairstyles.125

Rogers was terminated for wearing a braided “corn-row” hairstyle.126 She argued that the
braided hairstyle carried significance to black women who expressed their cultural and historical
essence through wearing it.127
The District Court rejected Roger‟s claim for the following reasons: “(1) the grooming
policy equally applied to all genders and races, (2) the policy only regulated something that
117
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could easily be changed, namely Rogers‟ hair and[,] (3) that the wearing of the hairstyle did not
concern a matter of high importance with respect to constitutional issues.”128 The District Court
reasoned that Rogers‟ braided hairstyle was not protected under Title VII because it was not an
immutable characteristic,129 and further implied that Rogers‟ braided hairstyle was not really
associated with African American culture.130
A similar grooming policy was challenged by Emma Carswell when she was terminated
for refusing to abide by the policy.131 She brought an unlawful racial discrimination claim
against her employer, Peachford Hospital.132 This unwritten policy required employees working
in the detoxification unit to dress conservatively.133 There were no complaints about Carswell‟s
job performance, and the only issues that the hospital had were pertaining to her chosen
hairstyle.134 Carswell wore her hair in corn-rows with two or more colored beads on the ends.135
She was asked to remove the beads from her hair or wear some type of head cover, but refused
and was subsequently put on suspension.136 Carswell was later terminated.137
Carswell argued that the grooming policy caused a disproportionate impact on black
people who frequently wore this hairstyle.138 The United States District Court held that Carswell
was fired solely because of her failure to abide by her employer‟s grooming policy. 139 Further,
the court held that Carswell‟s wearing of beads was not an immutable characteristic such as race

128

Turner, supra note 113, at 124.
Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231.
130
Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE. L.J. 769, 890-91 (2002).
131
Carswell, 1981 WL 224, at *1.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id. at *2.
139
Id.
129

24

or national origin.140

Therefore, the court found that there was no racial discrimination

present.141
Another grooming policy, yet different, was challenged by Leon Smith who had worked
as an agent to Delta Airlines for nine months.142 He was terminated for failing to follow a
company grooming policy pertaining to facial hair.143 Leon brought a Title VII action alleging
racial discrimination.144 Delta‟s grooming policy stated that,
[s]ideburns shall be no longer than even with the lower portion of the soft
lobe of the ear, and shall be light to moderate in thickness, such that there is
no appreciable change in facial outline therefrom. No „porkchops' will be
allowed.” “Mustaches” Mustaches are acceptable if kept short and neatly
trimmed; however, „handlebar‟ or „Fu Manchu‟ styles are not acceptable.145
Leon argued that black men had more difficulty complying with the grooming policy due to the
nature of hair growth.146 The trial court held that the grooming policy was not invalid and thus
not racially motivated.147 The court reasoned that the rule applied evenly to men of all races and
should not be struck down as a result.148 In this instance, “the [c]ourt [believed] that a black
person c[ould] have a closely trimmed sideburn, or if the company requires it, c[ould] have
closely trimmed hair. It may require more trimming more often to do that[, but the court did] not
see then that the rule itself [was] being discriminatory.”149 The United States Court of Appeals
also held that the grooming policy was not discriminatory.150 This trend tending to demonstrate
the reluctance of courts in recognizing the impact of grooming policies on black employees may
140
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likely become an issue for Treyvon at his new job or at some time throughout his professional
career.
b) The Courts Just Don‟t Get It!
Rogers, Carswell, and Smith are all primary examples of the unwillingness of courts to
protect individuals who have fallen victim to racial discrimination based on grooming policies
and various proxies for race. In each instance, the employer instituted a grooming policy which
disproportionately affected a black employee. Each court held that there was no discrimination
present because the grooming policies were applied equally and did not affect an immutable
“In essence courts treat being a member of a

characteristic held by the black employee.

protected group differently from behavior associated with that group and are less likely to protect
individuals from discrimination based on mutable appearance choices because individuals are
capable of avoiding discrimination by changing those traits.”151

Courts will only prohibit

employers from imposing trait requirements that are not relevant to the job when immutability
and a disparate impact occur simultaneously.152
In the Title VII context, the immutability construct operates in a way that limits claims
within protected classes by essentially separating specific parts of protected class identity from
statutory protection.153 An example of this proposition is evident from the Rogers Court noting
that Renee Rogers‟ braids had to be set apart from a form of involuntary and immutable raceassociated trait, like the Afro.154 Courts have failed to realize that the most devastating effect of
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this immutability requirement is the unclear distinction between mutability/immutability and the
need for black individuals to assimilate.
Courts tend to give the mutability/immutability distinction much more deference than it
deserves.155 Professor Kimberly A. Yuracko carefully notes that not many traits, including skin
color and sex are actually immutable.156 She further states that “[t]rait mutability/immutability
seems most often to be a matter of degree of difficulty rather than of absolute possibility.157 It
may be more difficult for a man with [pseudofolliculitis barbae]158 to shave than it is for a
woman with cornrows to adopt a different hairstyle, but neither is impossible.”159 Therefore, this
distinction makes it quite clear that the courts are providing an injustice rather than justice to
those individuals who have raised racial discrimination claims resulting from grooming policies
and other proxies for race.
Lastly, courts frequently fail to protect individuals from demands to assimilate to societal
norms if those demands pertain to mutable characteristics.160 Further, many courts fail to require
employers to justify legally valid reasons for requiring assimilation within the workplace. 161
Growing scholarly debate has suggested that laws prohibiting discrimination should protect
individuals from being required as an employment condition, to relinquish essential traits and
attributes of their protected group.162 For example, Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati argue that
requiring black but not white people to do identity work to fit in at their place of employment is
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discriminatory and violates Title VII.163 This form of decision-making by white employers is
burdensome because it makes black employees abandon essential facets of their “blackness” or
group identity in order to prosper in their employment.164 Nevertheless, courts continue to
overlook the fact that assimilation allows workplace inequities to thrive.

VII. RECOMMENDATION
Recognizing that the courts have continually allowed employers to discriminate against
applicants and employees through the use of proxies for race and grooming/appearance policies,
now is the time for reform that will compel the judicial system to change its current view of
modern discrimination claims. Scholars have long grappled with many ideas pertaining to the
way in which current anti-discrimination statutes can be revisited in attempt to eradicate
employer use of racial proxies in hiring and grooming/appearance policies, along with the need
for black individuals to lose their sense of “blackness” in order to remain competitive within
today‟s workforce.
Attorneys Rosalio Castro and Lucia Corral have argued that Title VII interpretation must
be expanded to better achieve its intended purpose.165 They have suggested that Congress
modify the language of Title VII by “includ[ing] the phrase „or any combination thereof‟ to the
text of the statute to make the law inclusive.”166 Other scholars have advocated for creating a
new legal right under current disparate treatment and impact theories that would essentially
create an avenue that would allow individuals to preserve their cultural identities within the
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workplace.167 A disparate treatment approach such as this would permit a black man, such as
Treyvon, or black woman with dreadlocks to file a claim of discrimination for being subjected to
adverse treatment related to stereotypes and grooming policies triggered by race.168
Additionally, Barbara Flagg has introduced two highly examined frameworks from which she
believes would address workplace discrimination based on what she considers “white subjective
decision-making.”169 She argues that the Foreseeable Impact and Alternatives Model would
effectively reach the objective of Title VII.170
The Foreseeable Impact Model is similar to current disparate impact analysis, but it
modifies certain aspects of the analytical framework.171 This approach would avoid present
disparate impact issues related to proving actual disparate effects because “foreseeable” disparate
effects would be emphasized.172 To demonstrate a foreseeable disparate effect, one only needs to
show the criterion used by an employer is associated more frequently among whites instead of
other racial groups.173 There also would need to be a showing that whites view the criterion
positively.174 Flagg argues that this approach focuses closely on the characteristics that are being
dispersed unevenly rather than on a particular individual.175
The Alternatives Model focuses directly to “capture the structural nature of
discrimination” by departing from existing disparate impact analysis.176 When analyzing a
167
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nonwhite individual‟s claim, racial workplace structure would be examined first. 177 If the place
of employment is found to be structured with whites occupying the majority of authoritative
positions, a presumption is raised that white-specific criteria was the determining factor in a
specific employment decision.178 The employer would then be charged with demonstrating the
specific criterion that was used when making the employment decision, along with its
objectives.179 The plaintiff would then be charged with showing that there is an alternative
method that could have been utilized to achieve the exact objective without addressing business
necessity.180
Although the Foreseeable Impact and Alternatives Model seem to have many positive
aspects, I am not an avid proponent of either approach. There are several flaws within the two
frameworks which will likely render the frameworks unworkable. While Foreseeable Impact
seeks to create a balance between regulation and employer autonomy, it unfairly “posits
differences between whites as a group and nonwhites as a group.”181 The Alternatives Model
addresses direct structural problems by providing a response, but nevertheless totally fails to
preserve a level of autonomy for private employers.182

Therefore, these flaws make both

approaches fall outside of the original intent of Title VII when enacted.
The approach that I support is a cross between Professor Maurice E. R. Munroe‟s
proposal for EEOC reform183 and Professor Kristin K. Green‟s administrative alternative.184
Munroe‟s approach would call for Congress to create a new framework from which unlawful
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discriminatory practices can be effectively addressed.185 The EEOC‟s principal objective would
be to eliminate discrimination, but no longer with a focus on individual charges. 186 The focus of
investigations would be to determine whether employers are utilizing discriminatory
employment practices.187 The EEOC would use current statistical information that it already
receives from employers through statutorily required reports to focus on employers who have an
inexplicably low number of black individuals employed and/or in management positions.188
Green‟s administrative alternative requires employers to file an annual report with the
EEOC detailing all structural efforts taken to ensure that discriminatory employment practices
are not being used by employers.189

The failure of an employer to take measures to rid

discrimination in the workplace may be equated with “intent to discriminate in a systematic
disparate treatment case.”190 Once employers demonstrate through the reporting requirement
that they have introduced context-specific anti-discrimination measures, the EEOC may then
compile the information to use in highlighting best practices to other employers who could use
them as models when designing their own plans.191
A combination of Munroe‟s and Green‟s recommendations as mentioned above would
essentially create an approach which would force employers to ensure that they are
implementing and utilizing hiring and workplace policies that are not discriminatory among
black individuals. Along with this combined approach, I would also suggest that the annual
report from employers demonstrate that they are not solely utilizing subjective criterion when
making hiring decisions. Holistically, this approach would not only protect black employees
185
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from being compelled to assimilate, but also prevent applicants such as Treyvon, from being
denied employment opportunities equal to that of their white counterparts through employer
support of diversity initiatives.
Furthermore, the EEOC would still be required to provide employers with notice prior to
commencement of an investigation.192 The most important aspect of this approach to taxpayers
would likely pertain to the amount of funds that will be saved as a result of the EEOC
abandoning the current requirement of handling all individual complaints.193 Additionally,
individuals will still have the right to hire their own attorneys to privately sue employers for
discrimination under Title VII.194 Rather than revisiting Title VII as suggested by other scholars,
application of this administrative-based approach would likely prove to be more efficient and
effective than the current controversial processes available to combat employment
discrimination.

VIII. CONCLUSION
Society cannot afford to continue to disregard the harmful effects that stereotypes and
proxies for race have on black applicants and employees in today‟s labor market. It is time for
effective and efficient reform that will address the illegal behavior that is increasingly being
utilized by employers as a basis for employment decisions. Well qualified black individuals
such as Treyvon will suffer profusely if action is not immediately taken. The EEOC has stood at
the forefront of combating discriminatory work practices, and should continue its efforts, yet in a
more proficient manner. By developing a comprehensive plan such as the combined approach
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that I suggested above, we will be taking the first step towards acknowledging the employment
rights of all people regardless of their race.
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